CRIMINAL ATTEIPTS-THE RISE AND FALL OF ANT ABSTRACTION by ARNOLD, THURMAN W.
CRIMINAL ATTEIPTS-THE RISE AND FALL
OF ANT ABSTRACTION
THURAL- N W. ARNOLD0
A DISCUSSION of the law of criminal attempts usually com-
mences with the statement that the problems involved are in-
tricate and difficult to solve and that the cases are hopelessly
confused. Legal problems are spoken of as confused under two
different sets of circumstances. First, where courts are doing
inconsistent things with similar fact situations, and second,
where courts are attempting to make the same rule cover ut-
terly dissimilar situations. In the first case the legal writer
usually attempts to justify one treatment or the other. In the
second case he makes an effort to refomaulate the rules so that
all or a great majority of the cases may appear reconciled with
them. This often involves the making of generalizations even
broader and vaguer than the original ones. It also usually in-
volves the creation of elaborate logical machinery for sorting the
dissimilar situations without exposing their complete dissimilar-
ity. Once this is done the opportunity is given to ingenious
attorneys to search far and wide for cases which no one would
ever consider treating the same as the case being argued ex-
cept for the fact that they come under the same so-called gen-
eral principles and the court speaks of them all in the same gen-
eral language. These cases must be distinguished, and of course
the court has great difficulty in doing so. In the attempt, how-
ever, hundreds of pages of legal literature are written. The
result is a statement like this:
"It has been truly said by a philosophical writer that 'the
subject of criminal attempt, though it presses itself upon the
attention wherever we walk through the fields of criminal law,
is very obscure in the books, and apparently not well understood
either by the text-writers or the judges.' And it may be added
that it is more intricate and difficult of comprehension than any
other branch of the criminal law." I
This despairing remark was made in a case where the defendant
was charged with attempting to poison with intent to kill by
buying poison, delivering it to a third party, and asking her to
put it in the coffee of the intended victim. The court was driven
to this language after comparing the case with one of an indict-
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i Hicks v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 223, 226, 9 S. E. 1024, 1025 (1889).
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ment for attempting to contract an incestuous marriage where
the defendant had eloped with his niece and sent for a magis-
trate to perform the ceremony.2
Another statement reads as follows:
"The doctrine of attempt to commit a substantive crime is
one of the most important and at the same time most intricate
titles of the criminal law. There is no title, indeed, less under-
stood by the courts, or more obscure in the text-books than that
of attempts." 3
This occurs in a case where the defendant was indicted for
attempting to obstruct and impede the administration of jus-
tice by giving A money, unlawfully to induce a witness to ab-
sent himself from court. The court sought light on the prob-
lem by considering (1) indictments for the possession of forged
bank bills, (2) a case involving the form of an indictment for
an attempt at larceny, (3) the evidence in a case where the de-
fendant offered money to another person to set fire to a barn and
furnished him matches, and (4) cases where a request to com-
mit adultery was held not to be indictable. In nearly all opin-
ions on attempts the same process is repeated.4  The courts,
2 People v. Murray, 14 Cal. 159 (1859). See infra note 4.
3 Cunningham v. State, 44 Miss. 685, 701 (1874). Similar statements are
frequent. E.g., "It is impossible to decide any case on this subject without
doing violence to some author or some adjudicated case." Stokes v. State,
92 Miss. 415, 425, 46 So. 627, 628 (1908). See also 1 BisHor, CRIIMINAL
LAW (9th ed. 1923) § 725; 8 R. C. L. 276; State v. Bowles, 70 Ian. 821,
79 Pac. 726 (1905); State v. Butler, 8 Wash. 194, 35 Pac. 1093 (1894).
4 This is perfectly illustrated by following the strange career of People
v. Murray, 14 Cal. 159 (1859), supra note 2. A conviction for an attempt
at an incestuous marriage was reversed on the theory that the defendant
had not gone beyond acts of preparation. In as much as he had done
practically everything possible, except actually perform the ceremony,
the case is most useful for all who desire to prove that any series of acts
of whatever nature have not gone far enough to constitute an attempt.
It has been cited with amazing frequency throughout the attempt cases,
the following being a few examples:
State v. Davis, 319 Mo. 1222, 6 S. W. (2d) 609 (1928), where the defend-
ant paid money to a party to kill someone for him; the incestuous marriage
case, among others, comforted the court in its conclusion that hiring some-
one to kill someone else was not an overt act on the part of defendant
"moving directly toward the commission of the offense." State v. Adder,
183 N. C. 687, 110 S. E. 650 (1922), an indictment for unlawful attempt
to manufacture intoxicating liquors where defendants had collected barrels
and other paraphernalia; the incestuous marriage case, among others, all
equally irrelevant, led the court to express itself as follows: "The alleged
attempt did not amount to a direct, ineffectual act towards the present
manufacture of spirituous liquors, to a 'commencement of the consumma-
tion', but, as indicated in the opinion of Chief Justice Fields in the Cali-
fornia case [the incestuous marriage case], the said acts consisted only in
'devising or arranging the means or measures necessary for the com-
mission of the offense.'" A dissenting opinion indicates some alarm over
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while admitting they get no assistance from these far fetched
analogies, seem unable to avoid using and trying to distinguish
them, because they all appear to be part of the law of "criminal
attempts."
What both courts and textwriters allege they are seeking are
the earmarks by which one can recognize an attempt regardless
of what is being attempted. We have a sufficiently clear pic-
ture in our mind of what conduct constitutes arson, rape, mur-
der and robbery. Of course it is blurred at the edges but we
do not talk about these crimes as hopelessly confused. Why
can we not be equally successful with the crime of attempt?
Let us take a few cases where the question might arise:
(a) A man attempts to drive his automobile through the
street at sixty miles an hour. Suppose the automobile will only
future prohibition enforcement as a result of this decision. Cornwell v.
Fraternal Accident Ass'n, 6 N. D. 201, 69 N. W. 191 (1896), a suit on an
accident insurance policy where it was held that hunting prairie chickens
with a loaded gun is not attempting to kill them. State v. Dumas, 118
Blinn. 77, 136 N. W. 311 (1912), in which the court had difficulty in dis-
tinguishing attempted arson with attempt at incestuous marriage. State
v. Wood, 19 S. D. 260, 103 N. W. 25 (1903), in which the language of
the incestuous marriage case saved the defendant from conviction for an
assault with a sharp and dangerous weapon.
Likewise People v. Di Donato, 90 Cal. App. 366, 265 Pac. 878 (1928)
(murder in connection with attempted burglary); Ex parte Floyd, 7 Cal.
App. 588, 95 Pac. 175 (1908) (conviction for attempt to forge reversed
because act mere solicitation); People v. George, 74 Cal. App. 440, 241 Pac.
97 (1925) (conspiracy to obtain money by false pretenses); People v.
Gilbert, 86 Cal. App. 8, 260 Pac. 558 (1927) (attempt to commit burglary);
People v. Parker, 74 Cal. App. 540, 241 Pac. 401 (1925) (lewd act); People
v. Petros, 25 Cal. App. 236, 143 Pac. 246 (1914) (pandering); Patrick v.
People, 132 Ill. 529, 24 N. E. 619 (1890) (attempt to rescue prisoner);
State v. Thompson, 118 Kan. 256, 234 Pac. 980 (1925) (attempt to assist
in an escape from jail); Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 Blass. 267, 59 N. E.
55 (1901) (attempt to burn building); People v. Youngs, 122 Mich. 292,
81 N. W. 114 (1900) (conviction for attempt to enter building reversed
on authority of incestuous marriage case); State v. Rains, 53 Mont. 424,
164 Pac. 540 (1917) (attempt at murder) ; Territory v. Reuss, 5 Mont. 605,
5 Pac. 885 (1885) (attempt to kill by placing bomb on intended victim's
porch; dissenting judges use incestuous marriage case to show this was
an act of preparation) ; Johnson v. State, 27 Neb. 687, 43 N. W. 425 (1889)
(assault with intent to rape); State v. Lung, 21 Nev. 209, 28 Pac. 235
(1891) (attempt at rape by midng cantharides in coffee); Cole v. State,
14 Okla. Cr. Rep. 18, 166 Pac. 1115 (1917) (solicitation to commit adultery
not an indictable attempt because, among other reasons, it was "merely
preparatory"); Ex parte Turner, 3 Okla. Cr. Rep. 168, 104 Pac. 1071 (1909)
(attempt at murder); Bryant v. State, 7 Wyo. 311, 56 Pac. 596 (1899)
(assault with intent to kill compared with attempt to commit incestuous
marriage); Hicks v. Commonwealth, supra note 1; People v. Rizzo, 246
N. Y. 334, 158 N. E. 888 (1927), infra note 61.
This list contains by no means all the cases in which this incestuous
marriage case has been cited. We stop only because we feel our point
has been sufficiently illustrated.
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go fifteen miles an hour, or is out of gas, or is in running con-
dition and the driver is just climbing in.r
(b) Four boys intend to take an automobile for a joy-ride and
are arrested as they take their seats. A special statute punishes
the conduct they have attempted.,
(c) The law makes the manufacture of liquor a felony. The
defendant sets up a still and is preparing some mash when he
is arrested.7
(d) A man attempts to kill another. He fails because the
gun is not properly loaded.8
(e) A boy under fourteen attempts to commit rape.9
' Attempts at speeding are not prosecuted. If such a prosecution wore
commenced would it not be sensible to discharge the defendant on the
ground that the policy of the particular statute did not include attempts?
Or should we adopt the device used in People v. Murray, supra note 2, and
say that any act outside actual speeding was "mere preparation"?
Held to be an attempt though the crime attempted was malum prohib.
itum. People v. Bauer, 216 Mich. 659, 185 N. W. 694 (1921).
7The result here will depend upon our attitude toward the prohibition
law. Obviously the word "manufacture" can be applied to all steps in the
process from the beginning to the end. Yet courts seem to feel that until
whiskey is actually produced no manufacturing has been done. State v.
Adder, 183 N. C. 687, 110 S. E. 650 (1922), 22 A. L. R. 219 (1923) (defend-
ant not guilty); Mote v. State, 205 Ala. 80, 87 So. 628 (1920) (defendant
guilty where fire yet running under still). See also Powell v. State, 128
Miss. 107, 90 So. 625 (1922); Shoemake v. State, 17 Ala. App. 461, 80 So.
151 (1920); White v. State, 27 Ga. App. 769, 109 S. E. 917 (1921).
8 This covers a variety of offenses, most of them found under the heading
of assaults, such as assault with intent to kill, assault with intent to
inflict bodily injury, assault with a dangerous weapon, presenting a loaded
firearm, shooting, etc. It also may be an attempt. See infra note 83.
9 Various solutions are offered by various courts and writers:
(a) The boy is guilty of an attempt, although he is presumed to be
incapable of rape, as one can always attempt the impossible. Beale,
Criminal Attempts (1903) 16 HARV. L. REY. 491, 498, citing Davidson V.
Commonwealth, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 540, 47 S. W. 213 (1898); Commonwealth
v. Green, 2 Pick. 380 (Mass. 1824). Mr. Beale admits, however, that the
weight of authority is against this theory.
(b) The boy is not guilty in a jurisdiction where he is presumed to be
impotent because he cannot attempt to commit an offense which he is
physically incapable of perpetrating. See cases cited by Beale, op. cit.
supra at 498, n. 5; Sayre, Criminal Attempts (1928) 41 HAnv. L. Rav. 821,
840, n. 70; Strahorn, Effect of Impossibility in Criminal Attempts (1928)
78 U. of PA. L. Rav. 962, 986, n. 57. Cases are collected in Note (1897)
36 L. R. A. 204; 33 Cyc. 1430, n. 25.
(c) The boy is not guilty because "the factual objective in the boy's
mind, that is, carnally to know the girl, does not in fact constitute the
crime of rape; and it is quite immaterial whether the boy believes that
what he is committing is rape or not." Sayre, op. cit. supra at 840.
(d) The boy is not guilty because "if there be juridical incapacity for the
consummated offense (e.g., infancy), there can be no conviction of the
attempt." 1 WHARTON CRIMINAL LAW (11th ed. 1912) § 223.
(e) The boy is not guilty because legal impossibility excuses "when it
[Vol. 40
CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS
(f) An intoxicated negro drives down the street at a reckless
rate of speed, causing injury to someone. He is indicted under
a special statute for assault with intent to murder.20
Let us ask ourselves the question whether there is any simi-
larity in the various kinds of conduct for which the various
defendants above are indicted. Are the reasons why the defend-
ant should be free or convicted in any of these cases at all sim-
ilar? Is there any similarity in the more immediate purposes of
the legislature in creating the above crimes? Obviously there
is not. These crimes are aimed at different kinds of conduct
and to protect society against entirely different things. Why
by classing them together should we compel courts to distinguish
the speeding case where the defendant is discharged and the
assault with intent to kill case where he is convicted?
Originally the word "trunk" was applied to trees. Suppose
later a writer on the science of things in general classifies "ele-
phants," "trees" and "tourists" under the same heading. The
reason for such a classification is that all three possess trunks.
The answer to the objection that the trunks are of different
kinds can easily be met by saying that to a nicely balanced
analytical mind, they all have one inherent similarity, i.e., they
all are used to carry things. The elephant's trunk carries hay
to the elephant's mouth, the tree trunk carries sap to the leaves
and the tourist trunk carries clothing. The soundness of the
new abstraction cannot perhaps be disputed but nevertheless
has the effect of negativing the existence of any interest to be protected
by the major prohibition against the consequence desired by the defend-
ant." In other words, "Of course, a boy under fourteen who attempts rape
would be guilty of common assault, and to that extent to which the law does
protect the interests of females against boys, she will be protected and he
will be punished. The interest to be free from bodily harm or the fear
thereof must be distinguished from the interest to be free from the forcible
capture of sexual favors and the fear thereof." Strahorn, op. cit. supra
at 987.1 0 In Chambliss v. State, 37 Ga. App. 124, 139 S. E. 80 (1927), the
defendant was held guilty of assault with intent to murder. The automobile
cases furnish a very interesting illustration of how courts have used the
penalties provided in assault statutes, traditionally treated as attempts,
to punish reckless driving where the reckless driving penalties have been
found inadequate. This process has gone so far that writers on attempt
are compelled to ignore these cases, although much of the support for their
machinery comes from eases of aggravated assault. Decisions and statutes
of this kind are discussed in an able article by Leon A. Tulin, The Role of
Penalties in Criminal Law (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1048. See also annotations,
(1922) 16 A. L. R. 917; (1922) 21 A. L. P. 1504; (1923) 27 A. L. R.
1182; (1924) 30A. L.R. 66; (1926) 41A. L. IL725; (1926) 42A. L.R. 1120;
(1927) 46 A. L. R. 1060; (1927) 49 A. L. R. 608; (1928) 53 A. I. R. 254.
It is interesting to note that these annotations treat assault with an auto-
mobile as the same kind of a thing and as an incident to manslaughter with
an automobile (which is exactly what it is), instead of trying to segregate
it and treat it as a part of the law of attempts.
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the classification would create at least verbal confusion and the
necessity for a great many fine distinctions."
On the other hand it is obvious that if we make attempt at
murder a substantive crime we have narrowed our generaliza-
tions sufficiently so that the cases are much less difficult to handle
than if we make attempts in general a substantive crime. How
far a man may go in his preparations to kill another man would,
of course, never be exactly determinable in advance, but at
least we have concentrated our field of observation as much as
we can. We would not need to clutter up our briefs or our
opinions with citations of cases where the defendant was trying
to commit arson or bigamy or some misdemeanor. We could
discard most of the present elaborate logical machinery as use-
less and misleading.
HISTORY OF CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS
The reason why we must try to talk about criminal attempts
without relation to the particular crime attempted is found in
the attitude of the legal mind of the Eighteenth Century. Mr.
Thomas Reed Powell describes that attitude as follows:
"If you think you can think about something which is attached
to something else without thinking about what it is attached
to, then you have what is called a legal mind." 12
The earliest cases on attempt do not try to describe "attempts"
in general; they justify conviction for an attempted crime by
the formula, voluntas reputabitur pro facto.
"Since there existed no general doctrine that attempts as
such were punishable, in the more extreme cases, such as kill-
ing and robbery, results much desired could be had by borrowing
from the ecclesiastical courts a doctrine which conveniently al-
lowed the will to be taken for the deed." 13
"I The uselessness of present abstractions in the law of attempts may be
seen from the following example: "Commission means the act of com-
mitting, doing or performing; the act of perpetrating." "The attempt is
the direct movement toward the commission after the preparations are
made." From these statements it becomes clear that a defendant who has
built a still and is working on top of it when arrested is engaged in mere
preparation and is not guilty of an attempt to manufacture, citing the
incestuous marriage case. Coffee v. State, 39 Ga. App. 664, 148 S. E. 803
(1929). See also Lee v. Commonwealth, 144 Va. 594, 599, 131 S. E. 2112,
214 (1926), to the effect that an attempt is "the commencement of' the
consummation."
12 From an unpublished manuscript.
13 Sayre, op. cit. supra note 9, at 827. For the historical development
of the law of criminal attempt the writer is indebted chiefly to Mr. Sayre.
It is restated here, however, from a different point of view. 0
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Of course this generalization did not mean that courts would
punish for mere intent. This has been shown in Mr. Sayre's
very careful historical analysis of the doctrine of attempts. The
phrase was simply a shorthand expression for the idea that in
the case of certain criminal conduct which might easily have re-
sulted in a crime the failure to achieve that result did not neces-
sarily indicate that the criminal would not be punished. In
short, no substantive law of criminal attempts and no definition
of the abstraction "attempt" was required. As Mr. Sayre says
in discussing an early case of attempted subornation of perjury:
"The interesting fact is that the court in convicting the de-
fendant made no mention of any convenient general doctrine
that the attempt to commit any crime is as such criminal; but
instead apparently followed the line of thought that any effort
to subvert justice by corrupting a witness is of itself a com-
plete substantive offense." 14
This rule is no more than an assertion of the power in a
court to extend the policy of a given rule prohibiting a crime
to certain acts which had failed to achieve the prohibited re-
sult. The advantage of this way of talking about a case lies in
the fact that it appears to classify the criminality of the attempt
under the heading of the crime attempted. Such treatment,
had it continued, would have eliminated the necessity of trying
to define attempts without reference to what is attempted. An
examination of the rule prohibiting the substantive crime would
have been our only guide in determining how far conduct which
failed of that result should be punished.
The Eighteenth Century method of legal analysis, however,
refused to admit frankly that courts by the exercise of a certain
limited discretionary power could extend the limits of substan-
tive crimes. To satisfy that habit of mind it became necessary
to classify all attempts as a species of substantive crime in
themselves. In other words, the man who attempted arson, the
man who attempted murder, and the man who attempted a mis-
demeanor were in theory all guilty of the same substantive of-
fense. In the words of Lord Mansfield:
"There was a distinction made at the bar between an act done
with intent to commit a felony and an act done with intent to
commit a misdemeanor. In the degrees of guilt there is a great
difference in the eye of the law but not in the description of
the offense." 15
In short, it is decreed by Lord Mansfield that there is such an
offense as attempt existing independently of the thing attempted.
14 Sayre, op. cit. supra note 9, at 830.
i Rex v. Scofield, Cald. 397, 402 (1784).
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Criminals may be classified into murderers, thieves, etc., and
attemptors.
Once recognized as a separate crime, an attempt must neces-
sarily be capable of division into constituent elements. Failure
to find them would simply mean that we had not done sufficient
analytical thinking. Thus commences our search for abstrac-
tions which will classify all sorts of dissimilar situations to-
gether, and which will enable us to apply the same rules to
cases requiring different kinds of treatment.
Sometimes the rule which the courts are considering is the
old common law jurisdiction over attempts. Generally, how-
ever, they are using the doctrines of attempt to interpret stat-
utes covering many kinds of conduct and providing many differ-
ent penalties. Any discussion of the law of criminal attempts
therefore requires consideration of its usefulness in the inter-
pretation of such statutes.
STATUTES COVERING CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS
While the common law writers have been busily engaged in
trying to make all attempts look alike the legislatures have been
equally busy putting attempts back where they belong as ad-
juncts of the particular crime attempted. Yet, in the interpre-
tation of these statutes, the general rules regarding attempt
are still used, and it is out of such cases that the formulae of
criminal attempt are drawn.
The statutes may be roughly divided into four different kinds:
(1) Statutes using the terminology of assault. Such statutes
include assaults with intent to murder,16 kill, maim, rape, rob,
steal, poison; assault with intent to commit any felony; assault
with intent to commit various sexual offenses where violence
is not essential; assaults in the first and second degrees.
(2) Statutes using the terminology of attempt, and applying
it to particular crimes. " Such statutes include attempts at
murder, arson, abortion, bribery, escape, burglary, robbery, pros-
titution, dueling, forgery, indecent offenses, vote buying, in-
fluencing jurors, suborning perjury, attempting to practice den-
tistry, attempting to entice away employees, and many others.
16 Sometimes attempt at murder and assault with intent to murder are
made different crimes. Massachusetts, for instance, punishes assault with
intent to murder with a maximum of ten years, MASS. GEN. LAws (1921)
c. 265, § 15, and attempt at murder by any means not constituting an
assault with a maximum .of 20 years, ibid. § 16. The distinction is one
frequently made, leading to much confusion. Infra notes 31, 32 and 33.
17 Often the language is similar to the following: "Any person who shall
procure or attempt to procure or be concerned in procuring . . . a female
inmate of a house of prostitution .... " Tux. Ca. STAT. (Vernon, 1928)
Art. 519. "Whoever shall invite, solicit, procure, allure or use any means
in alluring or procuring any female. . . ." Ibid. Art. 525.
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It is difficult to find any kind of attempt of frequent occurrence
which is not included in some special attempt statute.
(3) Statutes which omit to use either the words "assault" or
"attempt," but which prohibit practically the same kind of con-
duct as falls within the attempt and assault statutes. These
include such crimes as abusing girls under age with indecent in-
tent, presenting firearms, shooting or stabbing with intent to
kill, taking indecent liberties, offering to bribe.13
(4) Statutes giving the court power to punish for attempts
generally without linking up these attempts with any particular
crime mentioned in the statute. Such statutes are generally
spoken of as declaratory of the common law. They usually,
however, provide a very different scale of penalties.10
The impossibility of building any general logical scheme
around these statutes results not only from the fact that they
cover such obviously unrelated fields of human conduct, but also
because they are not at all consistent in their penalties. 0 The
Is A frequent device is to provide a different penalty for "unlawful" and
"malicious" action. Thus, in Virginia, shooting, stabbing or wounding with
intent to maim, disfigure, disable or kill is punishable by a maximum of
ten years. If, however, it is done "unlawfully but not maliciously" with the
intent aforesaid, the maximum is a jail sentence of not more than ten
months. Shooting at another person in a place of public resort or on a
street is an entirely different offense with a slightly different penalty.
Shooting in committing "or attempting to commit a felony" is a third
separate offense. VA. GEN. LAWS (1923) §§ 4402-4404.
I 'The following are typical examples of general attempt statutes:
"Whoever attempts to commit a crime by doing any act toward its com-
mission, but fails in its perpetration, or is intercepted or prevented in its
perpetration, shall, except as otherwise provided, be punished as follows.
.. " M1IAss. GN. LAws (1921) c. 274, § 6. Cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. (1918)
§ 6374; M IOH. Cohip. LAWS (Cahill, 1915) c. 263; MO. REV. STAT. (1919)
§ 4894; N. J. Corip. STAT. §§ 216-218; N. Y. CoNs. LAws c. 41, § 261;
N. D. Comp. LAWS (1913) § 10338; OKTA. REV, LAWS (1921) § 2297; VA.
CODE ANN. (1919) § 4767; AINE RET. STAT. (1916) c. 133, § 10; W. VA.
CODE ANN. (Barnes, 1923) c. 152, § 9.
20 Often there is more than one statute covering the same conduct but
prescribing different penalties. For example, in Indiana: "Buying votes--
Penalty... Whoever attempts to induce any person to vote or refrain
from voting for any candidate.., by offering such person any reward or
favor shall be fined . .. not more than fifty dollars and disfranchised
for ... a period of ten years. . . ." IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926)
§ 2913. On the other hand if a person is solicited to vote in another pre-
cinct the fine is $50 to $1000 and the imprisonment, which is compulsory
on the court, is one to five years. Ibid. §§ 2920, 2921.
Almost any prohibition law offers a whole scale of penalties for conduct
which is substantially the same. When the generalizations of attempt are
superimposed on attempt to violate prohibition laws the language becomes
almost unintelligible. Take Iowa as an example. Selling, keeping or
manufacturing liquor is one offense, IOWA CODE ANN. (1925) § 1924, while
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widely varying penalties naturally lead to widely varying inter-
pretations of the statutes. When a crime carrying a $500 pen-
alty is classified with one carrying five years in the penitentiary
and the same rules applied to each the language gets further
and further from reality.
21
One way of treating cases arising under these statutes is
to determine whether the policy of the statute can be said to
include the conduct of the defendant and whether the penalty
seems appropriate to the offense. If we do this we can confine
our attention to the particular prohibition under discussion, and
decide to what conduct we wish to extend it. Another method
is to forget the particular statute which the defendant is al-
leged to have violated or the particular crime which he has al-
most consummated, and put our emphasis on words in the stat-
ute such as "assault" and "attempt." When we do this every
other statute, no matter how different in policy or penalty, and
attempts at every other crime no matter how dissimilar im-
mediately become relevant. We are thereupon forced to create
numerous fine distinctions and abstract concepts such as the
following:
(1) A classification of crimes into those which are in the na-
ture of attempts, and hence cannot be attempted, and those which
can be attempted.
(2) A distinction between an assault and an attempt.
(3) A distinction between a solicitation and an attempt.
(4) A general formula of intent which can be applied to any-
thing.
(5) General definitions of "preparation" in the abstract, the
inherent meaning of the words "present ability;" distinctions
between acts done under a mistake of fact and acts done with
inadequate instruments, and many others.
Are such general conceptions useful legal tools or do they
create confusion and technicalities? This can best be answered
by considering the logic of criminal attempt in more detail.
keeping with intent to sell in a building, ibid. § 1929, keeping liquor or
assisting in keeping it in a club room, ibid. § 1933, drinking on trains, ibid.
§ 1937, are all different offenses with different penalties. So also illegal
transportation, ibid. § 1945a, carrying liquor on trains, ibid. § 1937, con-
cealing the fact that a package carried contains liquor, ibid. § 1934, and
unlawful delivery by carriers, or any other person, ibid. § 1943, aro
distinct offenses with varying penalties.
There is an equally great variety of statutes punishing different kinds of
indecent conduct. For example, see Tnx. CR. STAT. (Vernon, 1928) Tit.
10: "Offenses against Morals, Decency and Chastity," which includes about
forty different offenses. There are hundreds of different kinds of assaults
and special attempts at different crimes of violence.
21 See Tulin, op. cit. supra¢ note 10.
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ATTEMPTED RATIONALIZATION OF ATTEMPTS
In order to make this examination we must attempt to sum-
marize, which is not easy because writers are not in accord as
to the proper form the generalizations should take.
"It was not until almost the end of the 18th Century, how-
ever, that under the creative genius of Lord Mansfield a general-
ization was formulated covering attempts to commit crime as
such; the present doctrine therefore is essentially a modern
one, and it is not unnatural that its limits are still somewhat
uncertain." 22
The first problem, however, seems to be the creation of a rule
determining what crimes may be attempted. The usual state-
ment is: Any attempt to commit any crime is a substantive
offense amounting to a common law misdemeanor.23
This represents Lord Mansfield's view and in varied forms
has been copied in the general attempt statutes. It is obviously
not true-attempts at many crimes are not punishable at all.
Therefore we must try to make distinctions. One of the most
frequent is this: If the offense be a misdemeanor which is
",nmtum prohbibitu2," "purely statutory," or "not malicious,"
its attempted commission will not be criminal .24
Such words always make trouble. The phrase "mialun pro-
hibituv" has lost its historical meaning. - Used here we cannot
22 Sayre, op. cit. supra note 9, at 837.
23 "An attempt to commit any crime,' treason, felony, or misdemeanor,
is itself criminal, though the attempt fails." Beale, op. cit. supra note 9,
at 491. See also WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 9, at § 212; BisHoP, op. cit.
supra note 3, at § 772.
24This language is taken from 16 C. J. 111. For the argument that at-
tempts at offenses not mala in se are not indictable, see Wharton, Crbiinal
Attempts (1883) 17 CENT. L. J. 26. Compare the following statements:
"It is urged that though made a felony by the statute the offense is one
maum prohibitum and not vzolum in se and that as to the former an at-
tempt to commit it is not indictable.... This rule can have no application
in this state. Under our statute an attempt is punishable even if the
punishment for the offense be a fine or imprisonment in the county jail."
People v. Bauer, 216 Mich. 659, 185 N. W. 694 (1921). "It is elementary
law that an attempt to commit a misdemeanor is not an indictable offense."
State v. Redman, 121 S. C. 139, 113 S. E. 467 (1922). "An attempt to
commit a misdemeanor is a misdemeanor." Mote v. State, 17 Ala. App.
526, 87 So. 628 (1920).
2 5 Blackstene considered crimes mla in sc to be crimes against the law
of nature and crimes nuala prohibita those owing their origin not to the
law of nature but to civil society. 4 BLACKSTONE, CO31MENTAnIES 8. Hence
statutory crimes not originating at common law were inaila prohibita. But
the notion that the common law is more sacred than statute law is dying.
Hence we swing back to the idea that crimes imla in se are those that are
"intrinsically wrong." See State v. Trent, 122 Ore. 444, 252 Pac. 975
(1927); 13 R. C. L. 848; BisHoP, op. cit. supra, note 3, at § 333. But what
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even take it to mean that serious crimes may be attempted and
less serious ones may not. Certainly driving while intoxicated
is a more serious crime than an attempt at smuggling lace, yet
it is not one which will be extended so as to punish attempts.
The rule therefore amounts to no more than that some attempts
are punishable and others are not.
A second qualification may be stated as follows: There can
be no attempt to commit a crime which is in itself an attempt. 6
This may sound logical but it assumes that we are able to
tell whether a crime is in its nature an attempt.2 Are the
offenses of driving while intoxicated, violation of the Mann
Act, indecent solicitation, shooting dangerous firearms, assault
with intent to kill, to rape, to maim, crimes which are attempts
at something else? And if so, what bearing should this have
upon our method of dealing with them?
The distinction is sometimes made between acts which are
criminal because of their consequences, and those which are
criminal because of the surrounding circumstances-an act be-
ing defined as a willed muscular contraction.5 But how can one
separate the consequences from the surrounding circumstances?
And if that is possible, how does one know whether it is the
consequences or the surrounding circumstances which makes
the act criminal? The defendant marries when his first wife
is alive. Is it the consequences or the surrounding circum-
stances of the second marriage which makes the willed mus-
cular contraction involved in the second ceremony criminal?
Is it the consequent noise involved in the willed muscular con-
traction of the throat or the surrounding circumstances which
makes blasphemy criminal?
is "intrinsically wrong"? See Note (1929) 43 HARv. L. REV. 117, discussing
"moral turpitude;" Greenfield, Malum Prohibitum (1921) 7 A. B. A. J. 493.
26 The language is taken from 16 C. J. 111. See also Wilson v. State, 53
Ga. 205 (1874), where a conviction was reversed because the jury found a
verdict for attempt to assault whereas the law knew no such crime.
27 Bishop tries to do it this way: There are two classes of cases--those in
which the criminality comes primarily from the act, and those in which
it proceeds either primarily or in part from the specific intent as distin-
guished from general malevolence of mind. The doctrine of attempt applies
only to the latter class. For in the former class, where the guilt is measured
primarily by the act and only general malevolence is required to be shown,
if the act has proceeded far enough for the law to notice it, it constitutes
a substantive offence and is not an attempt. BIsHOP, op. cit. supra note 8,
at § 729.
Wharton is simpler: "But to make an attempt indictable it must be to
commit a consumated, not an inchoate offence. Hence no indictment lies
for an attempt to commit an attempt or assault." WHARTON, Op Cit.
supra note 9, at § 212.
2 8 Mr. Sayre refers to this distinction although it is not clear whether he
intends it to have any bearing upon the problem of what crimes may be
attempted. Sayre, vp. cit. supra note 9, at 838, n. 64, 65.
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One author divides the field into direct and relative attempts.=^
In the former recourse to the principles of the major crime is
unnecessary, whereas in the latter this process appears to be
necessary. There can be no attempt at a direct attempt. But
the query immediately arises, Why not? We do not punish
attempts at ordinary assaults which carry light penalties. But
suppose the accused is guilty of conduct tending toward an ag-
gravated assault but which does not seem to require the heavier
penalty. The court is confronted with the alternative of either
discharging the accused or modifying the penalty to make it
more nearly fit his conduct. An easy way to accomplish this is
by making attempts at aggravated assaults punishable, and this
is frequently done.30 It is academic to call such cases "wrong"
because assault is in the nature of an attempt and hence can-
not be attempted, particularly when a common sense result is
reached. In short the generalization that there can be no at-
tempt at a crime in the nature of an attempt tells us nothing
and tends merely to divert the court's mind from the real issue.
The distinction between attempts at ordinary crimes and at-
tempts at crimes in the nature of an attempt necessitates an-
other difficult concept which we may state as follows: There
is a fundamental distinction between an assault and an
attempt.31
An assault is usually defined as an unlawful attempt coupled
with the "present ability" to commit a violent injury. An assault
therefore seems to be an attempt plus something else.
Consequently when an accused is indicted for an assault his
attorney will endeavor to show the court that the crime com-
mitted was actually a mere attempt. If the court is to reach a
non-technical result and yet hold the accused its reasoning must
become very technical indeed. For example, in a California
case,-32 the defendant put a tin box of gun powder in a stove
and was in another county when the explosion occurred. He
was found guilty of assault with a deadly weapon. Did he have
29 Strahorn, op. cit. supra note 9, at 963.
30 For example a negro was indicted for assault with intent to commit
rape, the minimum penalty being two years. The evidence showed that he
merely frightened a woman by accosting her. He was sentenced to six
months imprisonment on conviction for "an attempt to commit an assault
with intent to commit rape," which sentence was affirmed. Burton v. State,
8 Ala. App. 295, 62 So. 394 (1913). In State v. Herron, 12 Mont. 230, 29
Pac. 819 (1892), the indictment was drawn for attempt to commit an
assault with a deadly weapon, probably because the state could not prove
the gun -was loaded and therefore wanted to avoid the technicalities of the
phrase "present ability." A conviction was sustained.
31 Ross v. State, 16 Wyo. 285, 93 Pac. 299 (1908); People v. Lee Kong,
95 Cal. 666, 30 Pac. 800 (1892) ; People v. Gardner, 98 Cal. 127, 32 Pac. 880
(1893); Miller v. State, 84 Tex. Cr. App. 168, 206 S. W. 524 (1918).
= People v. Pape, 66 Cal. 366, 5 Pac. 621 (1885).
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"present ability" to inflict injury when he put the box in the
stove? In order not to discharge him the appellate court was
forced to assert that he had. Yet at the same time it reaffirmed
the fundamental distinction between an assault and an attempt.
Had the court been free to dispense with this generalization its
opinion would have been shorter and more intelligible. The
results of the use of the concept "present ability," moreover, are
not always so fortunate.33
Since "attempt" is a definite substantive crime it follows that
it must be distinguished from "solicitation;" hence the inven-
tion of a new abstraction, "solicitation" without reference to
the thing solicited. The rule may be stated as follows: Solicita-
tion is a separate offense from attempt though both are common
law misdemeanors.3 4
"Analytically the two crimes are distinct. Each has its own
peculiar features; clearly not every indictable solicitation can
be considered an indictable attempt. . .. In spite of their
many similarities, therefore, these two crimes should not be
confused." 35
Courts talk about solicitation in two classes of cases. (a)
Where a defendant has been indicted for attempt and his acts
are not sufficiently serious to come within the policy of the
criminal prohibition invoked he is often held not guilty of an
33 Where A points a gun at B and there is no proof that it is loaded, the
following questions arise:
(a) Does a man with an unloaded gun have present ability?
(b) If he thinks it is loaded does he have apparent present ability?
(c) Does the state have to prove the gun is loaded or is there a presump-
tion to that effect?
For collections of conflicting decisions see annotations in (1908) 15
L. R. A. (N. s.) 1272; (1913) 41 L. R. A. (N. s.) 181; (1913) 42 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 975; 5 C. J. 725.
(d) If A is lying in ambush to kill B who never knows that an assault
is contemplated, is this an assault? No. State v. Barry, 45 Mont. 598,
124 Pac. 774 (1912). Yes. People v. Lilley, 43 Mich. 521, 5 N. W. 982
(1880). Cf. People v. Pape, supra note 32.
(e) If instead of a gun, poison is put where B may get it, is this an
assault, or is it an attempt? If it is not an assault how can we distinguish
it from case (d) above?
(f) If the case is one under a statute of assault with intent to kill are we
going to preserve the same definition of assault that we did under the simple
assault cases? Cf. People v. Pape, supra note 32.
34 "It seems to be clear that the common-law misdemeanor of attempting
to commit an offense cannot be accomplished by the solicitation of another
to do the act." Beale, op. cit. supra note 9, at 505. See also WHARTON, op.
cit. supra note 9, at § 218. For guarded statements that the weight of
authority seems to hold that solicitation cannot be an attempt see: 8 R. C. L.
§ 295; 16 C. J. § 98; and Notes in (1889) 3 L. R. A. 747; (1894) 25 L. R. A.
434; L. R. A. 1918A 98.
35 Sayre, op. cit. supra note 9, at 857.
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attempt because what he did was a mere solicitation30 Actually
the problem here is of the same kind as is involved in the defini-
tion of mere preparation. The only question before the court
should be whether to extend the policy of the statute to cover
the conduct of the defendant" To try to draw an artificial
distinction between solicitation and attempt simply results in
rather absurd technicalities. For example, in the recent case
of State v. Lowrie,38 a wife hired another person to kill her
husband. The conviction was reversed because she should have
been indicted for solicitation. The case involved the interpreta-
tion of a statute but the court forgot the statute in its desire
to keep up the distinction between attempt and solicitation.
(b) The second class of cases consists of those where the
defendant is indicted for solicitation as a crime in itself. For
the solicitation of what crimes will a defendant be indicted?
This is a problem very similiar to that involved in the deter-
nuination of what crimes may be attempted. No generalization
can be made without considering the particular crime. 3 An
example of the confusion resulting from the attempt to segre-
gate the crime of solicitation without regard to the thing solic-
ited may be found in the Connecticut case of State v.
Schleifer.- There the defendant made an incendiary speech
during a street car strike. The court, under its general power
to punish for offenses against the safety of the public, properly
held it to be a common law offense. Most of the opinion, how-
ever, is taken up with the citation and distinction of cases in-
volving solicitations to commit adultery, to burn buildings, and
to commit murder. The court finally came to the conclusion
that there is much uncertainty as to what solicitations constitute
crimes and what do not. But since "certainty in the knowl-
edge of what is or is not a crime is the safety of the individual,"
36 Becker v. State, 283 Pac. 796 (Okla. 1929) ; Weaver v. State, 16 Okla.
Cr. Rep. 564, 185 Pac. 447 (1919); State v. Riseling, 186 Mo. 521, 85 S. W.
372 (1905) ; State v. Roby, 194 Iowa 1032, 188 N. W. 709 (1922) ; Stabler v.
Commonwealth, 95 Pa. 318 (1880).
37 Compare solicitation to commit adultery which is neither an attempt
(Cole v. State, 14 Okla. Cr. Rep. 18, 166 Pac. 1115 (1917)) nor a criminal
solicitation (L. I. A. 1918A 98), with attempted subornation of perjury
(48 C. J. Tit. Perjury § 196) and attempt to bribe, which can only consist of
solicitation but which are punished as attempts.
38 12 S. W. (2d) 43 (Mo. 1928). The pertinent comment of a dissent-
ing judge in this case is as follows: "It is not alone by repeal or holding
of constitutional invalidity that an affirmative statute may be rendered
inoperative. Judicial construction may be employed to effect the same
end, and the doctrines of overt act and accessory before the fact be adopted
to assist in the obsequies!' A similar case is State v. Davis, 6 S. W. (2d)
609 (Mo. 1928), in which the same judge dissented.
39 The cases are collected in Note (1925) 35 A. L. R. 961.
40 99 Conn. 432, 121 At. 805 (1923).
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the court felt obliged to seek that certainty by a ruling that
"the solicitation to a crime should be of a crime in every in-
stance where to commit the same offense would be a crime." 41
Such a rule was considered to be "definite and understandable,
entirely practical, and completely just." This, of course, leaves
one entirely up in the air as to just what solicitation is. It is
proper to discourage incendiary speeches if they are sufficiently
extreme, but to penalize the publication of all revolutionary
books and pamphlets is a step which the courts would not care
to take. The problem of dealing with incendiary speeches has
nothing whatever to do with the old common law crime of solic-
itation; it is a problem relating to the orderly handling of strikes
and should be discussed with that in mind.
Having marked out as far as possible the limits within which
crimes may be attempted, the next step is to discover the ele-
ments of an "attempt." There appear to be three requisites.
First, there must be a specific intent to commit the crime. 2
This, in turn, gives rise to two queries: (a) what is meant
by specific intent, (b) in a case where the defendant was mis-
taken as to what he was doing what was it that he "intended"
to do. Let us take the first of these queries.
(a) Obviously "intent" may mean one thing in one class of
crimes and another thing in another. Therefore when we have
a crime including all classes of crimes we will never be able
to tell satisfactorily what we do mean by "intent." Subjective
intent, objective intent, intent inferred from conduct, intent in-
ferred from the presumption that a man intends the reasonable
and probable consequences of his acts-all these run into one
another, and the last may even be used to include negligence.
They are methods of talking fitted to particular cases. From
the point of view of a prosecution for attempted murder
we say that a man cannot blunder into an attempt; 43 but the
application of this generalization to other situations becomes
dangerous, for in some cases reckless conduct may require pun-
41 Compare Wharton's concern over the notion that all solicitations arc
criminal: "But to make bare solicitations or allurements indictable as at-
tempts, not only unduly and perilously extends the scope of penal adjudica-
tion, but forces on the courts psychological questions which they are incom-
petent to decide. . . . What human judge can determine that there is such
a necessary connection between one man's advice and another man's actions,
as to make the former the cause of the latter?" WHARTON, op. cit. supra
note 9, at § 218.
42 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 9, at § 215; 16 C. J. 115; Sayre, op. cit.
supra note 9, at 841.
43Thacker v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 767, 114 S. E. 504 (1922), indict-
ment for attempt at murder where the defendant fired three shots into a
tent where the witness was sleeping. A conviction was reversed because
intent could not be inferred.
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ishment fully as much as intended conduct." That tlds is often
realized by the courts is evident from such decisions as those
holding reckless driving while intoxicated an assault with in-
tent to kill.4 ' The concept of intent is probably still retained
in criminal law because of the desire to have one human ele-
ment of "blameworthiness" as a basis for punishment. But
even so, how can the element of blameworthiness in attempts
be acertained without having in mind the thing attempted?
(b) Where the defendant acted under a mistake of fact did
he "intend" to do what he mistakenly "thought" he was doing.
(1) Suppose a man shoots at a stump thinking it is his
enemy. Did he intend to shoot his enemy, which is criminal,
or did he intend to shoot the stump, which is not criminal? "
(2) Suppose a boy under foulteen attempts to commit rape?
Has he attempted to commit a' crime which is inpossible for
him to commit or is the thing which he is trying to do not a
crime at all? -7
(3) Suppose Lady Eldon tries to smuggle French lace into
England when as a matter of fact the lace is not French lace
at all but non-dutiable lace, about which she has made a mis-
take. Shall we say that this is an attempt to smuggle French
lace or that what she has attempted to do was to smuggle that
particular lace, which was not a crime? 41
(4) Suppose A attempts to forge a check by raising the fig-
ures. Shall we say that he has attempted to commit the crime
of forgery in an impossible way or shall we say the thing which
he attempted is not a crime? -9
- Looney v. State, 153 S. E. 37Z (Ga. 1930), assault with intent to
murder. Defendants wantonly poured gasoline on a negro and lit a match
"to see him run." An instruction stating among other things that on the
question of intent to murder the court could consider the brutality of the
assault was upheld. In Hankins v. State, 103 Ark. 28, 145 S. W. 524
(1912), an instruction that every sane man is presumed to know the natural
and probable consequences of his acts was held proper in a trial for assault
with intent to kill. In Jackson v. State, 94 Ala. 85, 10 So. 509 (1892), the
court held that "positive and specific" need not be added to words describ-
ing intent to kill. See also Scott v. State, 141 Ill. 195, 30 N. E. 329 (1892).
45 Chambliss v. State, supra note 10.
46 Wharton says there is guilty intent here but no overt act. WHARTON,
op. cit. supra note 9, at § 225. Mr. Beale thinks there is no guilty intent.
Beale, op. cit. supra note 9, at 494. Mr. Sayre says there is an overt act
and guilty intent but it is not punishable if defendant did not act reason-
ably. Sayre, op. cit. supra note 9, at 853. Cf. State v. Mitchell, 170 Mo.
633, 71 S. W. 175 (1902); People v. Lee Kong, 95 Cal. 666, 30 Pac. 800
(1892).
47 See supra note 9.
48 The case is set out in WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 9, at § 225.
-Wilson v. State, 85 Mliss. 687, 38 So. 46 (1905), held not to be an
attempt.
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(5) Suppose the defendant attempts to commit an abortion
where the victim is not pregnant. Shall we say that he in-
tended to commit an abortion or that the thing which he is
trying to do is not a crime? 50
It is impossible to apply the same abstract logical system to
all of these questions without first disregarding the purposes
of the statute. After doing so, there is nothing inherent in
any of the situations above outlined which makes it a logical
necessity to say that the defendant has attempted to commit a
crime or that he has not. Experts appear to differ. In the
stump case some would hold that there was no indictable at-
tempt because shooting at a stump is not a crime,5 ' whereas in
the rape case there is an attempt for the reason that the mere
impossibility of success does not prevent this from being an
indictable attempt.52 One author comes to the conclusion that
if a man shoots at a hole thinking it is a policeman's eye he
is not guilty, whereas if he shoots through a hole at a man
who is not there he is guilty. 3 This would be a curious basis
upon which to determine whether a dangerous gunman should
be freed.
Another line of reasoning holds that, as one of the "factual
objectives" of the man who shoots at a stump is criminal he
may therefore be guilty of an attempt; in the rape and forgery
cases, however, none of the "factual objectives" being criminal
the defendant may not be held.5" Even assuming the validity
and pertinancy of the reasoning to this point, it seems to re-
quire further machinery. Accordingly it is suggested that
the man who shot at a stump thinking it his enemy should be
held only if his mistake was a reasonable one. Such a rule is
open to two objections. Its justification is that society is in no
danger from men who make unreasonable mistakes-a state-
ment which would hardly appeal to the criminal psychiatrist.
Furthermore, when we introduce the reasonable man test we
have admitted that the rule cannot give us any more definite
results than if we simply considered the policy of the statute.
In short, we have merely evolved a cumbersome metaphysical
machine which leaves us just where we started, without
predictability.
50 State v. Snyder, 188 Iowa 1150, 177 N. IV. 77 (1920), 10 A. L. R. 309
(1921), held not to be an attempt.
For an explanation of these cases on the theory that abortion statutes
are passed only to protect the interest of the foetus and that no interest
exists to be protected where there is no foetus, see Straham, op. cit. Mipra
note 9, at 979.
51 Supra note 46.
52 Supra note 9.
53 Beale, pp. cit. supra note 9, at 495.
54 Sayre, op. cit. supra note 9, at 840, 852.
[Vol. 40
CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS
Another author reconciles these cases by assuming a new
abstraction, impossibility, and dividing it into three classes,
(a) extrinsic impossibility, (b) intrinsic impossibility, (c) legal
impossibility.- Intrinsic and extrinsic impossibility both may
or may not be a defense but legal impossibility will always be
a defense. Again, the difficulties of defining impossibility with-
out regard to what it is which is impossible may easily be im-
agined. The purpose of the classification, however, seems to
be simply to justify convicting the defendant in case (1) above
and acquitting him in cases (2) and (4). 1
The distinctions made by these authors are ingenious, but as
they lead us either to absurd results or else to no results at all
it is contended that they do no more than illustrate the fact
that the search for general principles underlying the abstraction
"intent" in criminal attempts is useless.
The second requisite of a criminal attempt may be stated as
follows: The defendant must perform an act toward the ac-
complishment of the crime.
It appears to be customary to make two classifications here:
(a) the means used must be reasonably adapted to the end;-G
(b) the act must go beyond mere preparation.
Under the first heading we put cases where the defendant's
acts were not interrupted but were inadequate to accomplish
his purpose. Since a poorly aimed pistol cannot kill any more
than a toy pistol, we encounter difficulties unless we wish to
punish every impossible attempt. Therefore we invent phrases
such as "reasonably adequate means." These are unobjection-
able in so far as they are vague and in fact allow a degree of in-
dividualization; but they are objectionable when they induce
the citation of all kinds of irrelevant cases under the theory
that there is such a concept as reasonably adequate means ap-
plicable to attempts at all crimes.57 Occasionally this tendency
leads to an absurd result, as in the cases where a defendant
is discharged who has assaulted someone with a gun which the
state could not prove was loaded, 8 and in the cases, of which
traces still remain, where a defendant attempting to pick an
empty pocket is held not to have attempted a crime.-,
5 Strahorn, op. cit. supra note 9.
56 WHATON, op. cit. supra note 9, at §§ 219, 220; Beale, op. cit. supra
note 9, at 496. Some of the theories and problems here have already been
discussed under the heading of intent. The classifications are often con-
fused.
57 Cf. State v. Glover, 27 S. C. 602, 4 S. E. 564 (1888), and State v.
Clarissa, 11 Ala. 57 (1847), two cases difficult to reconcile under any general
concept since the actual situations are very different.
rs See cases cited supra note 33.
5 Regina v. Collins, 9 Cox C. C. 497 (1864), attempt to pick an empty
pocket held not criminal; overruled in England by Regina v. Ring, 17 Cox
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Under the second heading we distinguish between "prepara-
tion" and attempt. Various tests have been laid down."0  The
courts, while usually admitting that each case must be decided
on its particular facts, continue to confuse their opinions by
citing long lists of cases of quite different kinds of crimes.
Here also, to discuss whether acts done, in an attempted rob-
bery are comparable to acts done in an attempted incestuous
marriage, as they relate to the general principle of proximate-
ness, is as valuable as discussing whether Milton is more poet-
ical than a pig is fat. Yet this is constantly being done, again
with occasional absurd results. The recent case of People 'v.
Rizzo I' furnishes a beautiful example. The four defendants
in that case planned to rob a messenger carrying a payroll.
Armed with guns they rode about looking for him. The
police followed and arrested them as they ran into a build-
ing to commit the robbery. The payroll messenger was not in
the building, and indeed the defendants never saw him. From
an adverse decision in the trial court one of the defendants,
Rizzo, appealed, but the New York Appellate Division affirmed
the conviction.62 It seemed to that court that the case resem-
bled an attempt to pick an empty pocket. The majority opinion,
however, closed with the following paragraph:
"The trial of a criminal case should be a search for the truth,
not a contest over technicalities. Here the defendant did every-
thing in his power to successfully carry out the robbery. He
failed only because of the alertness of the detectives who pre-
vented its perpetration and saved the proposed victim." '1
Two judges dissented on the ground that the conduct of the
defendants constituted mere preparation under the principles
laid down in the incestuous marriage case. A paragraph from
that extraordinary case was cited. The Court of Appeals fol-
lowed the dissenting judges. Their opinion is very interesting.
It commences with a paragraph congratulating the police on
their excellent work in preventing a serious crime. The body
of the opinion then explains why the act of the defendant was
C. C. 491, (1892); overruled in America by Commonwealth v. McDonald,
5 Cush. 365 (Mass. 1850), and other cases; revived again in People v.
Purcell, 269 Ill. 467, 109 N. E. 1007 (1915), holding that there can be no
attempt to steal from one who has nothing of value on his person, and
carefully distinguishing the Massachusetts case where value was not in-
volved. These pickpocket cases are discussed by Mr. Sayre under reason-
able mistake of fact.
60 (1924) 24 COL. L. Rav. 790; (1928) 12 MINN. L. Rav. 658; 8 R. C. L.
278.
81246 N. Y. 334, 158 N. E. 888 (1927).
62 People v. Rizzo, 221 App. Div. 353, 223 N. Y. Supp. 200 (1st Dep't
1927).63 Ibid. 356, 223 N. Y. Supp. at 203.
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not one "done with intent to commit a crime and tending but
failing to effect its commission." The concluding paragraph
urges the governor to pardon the three defendants who did not
appeal and were therefore in prison. It was not considered
fair to permit them to remain incarcerated simply because they
were not possessed of sufficient mental agility to realize their
own innocence.
While the above account of the reasoning of the court makes
it seem absurd to congratulate the police for arresting persons
who had not committed the crime they were arrested for
perhaps it is not a fair statement in as far as it does not take
into consideration the logical difficulties before the court aris-
ing from the law of criminal attempts. If we assume, as the
court did, the existence of rules governing attempts in general,
we may well come to the conclusion that it is better to let
these robbers go free than to run the risk of having to imprison
other persons who did similar acts in the attempted commission
of more trivial offenses. Criticism should be directed not
against a great court which felt itself bound to follow an an-
cient course of reasoning, but rather against the utility of the
abstractions of criminal attempts as substantive crimes. The
reasoning of the opinion is as coherent as the nature of the
abstractions permit and the case is a very useful one, though
not perhaps for the purpose that the court intended it.
The final requisite of a criminal attempt is that it must have
failed.65 Does this mean that if a defendant is indicted for an
attempt and convicted it is prejudicial error if the evidence
happened to show that he was successful? If so we have an-
other abstraction to define, to-wit, "failure." G1 Does this re-
64 Curiously enough legal commentators saw nothing out of the way in
the case. The writer of a note in (1928) 12 MiNN. L. Rnv. 658 sees only a
test of what is preparation. Mr. Strahorn considers it an excellent e.xample
of "extrinsic impossibility excusing the criminal attempt." There is of
course no record of how the police or the pardoned gangsters felt about it,
but this is assumed to be unimportant. If the public objects their recourse
is with the legislature. Yet what more can the legislature say since the
act already provides that "an act done with intent to commit a crime and
tending but failing to effect its commission" is an attempt. N. Y. PE..NAL
L W § 2.
65 Cases are collected in Sayre, op. cit. supra note 9, at 838; 16 C. J. 113,
n. 17; WHARToN, op. cit. supra note 9, at § 212. Contra: State v. Shepard,
7 Conn. 54 (1865). Mrany statutes allow a conviction for attempt under an
indictment for the completed crime. People v. Vanderbilt, 199 Cal. 461,
249 Pac. 867 (1926).
E An abstraction even as general as this one may be of great value so
long as its purpose is kept in mind. If a court makes "failure" an element
of attempt for purposes of instructing the jury but refuses to allow this
conception to be used to reverse a case merely because the evidence showcd
the defendant was successful, the conception of failure is very useful.
However, when we make failure a fixed conceptual element of attempt for
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quirement also apply to every statute where the word attempt
is used-e.g. one relating to confidence games-which may ob-
viously be drawn to avoid just such technicalities? 6 It prob-
ably does if we are forced to classify all statutes which use
the word "attempt" together, regardless of the thing they
prohibit.
Two questions remain for discussion:
(1) Is there a simpler method by which the courts can talk
about attempts at crimes?
(2) If a simpler method exists does the so-called weight of
authority prevent the courts from adopting it?
May we not restate our generalizations so as to describe more
accurately the results of the past and cause less confusion in
the future? Suppose we say that the law of criminal attempts
is not a classified set of rules describing the elements of any
crime or covering any given conduct. When we talk about
the law of criminal attempts in, general suppose we refer to
it as a power or discretion that has been given to the courts
either by the legislature. or by common law precedent to ex-
tend the limits of prohibitions against certain kinds of conduct
to conduct which does not quite fall within the terms of those
prohibitions. We immediately recognize that this power is very
all purposes, we get results like this: The defendant was attempting to steal
from a store but when accosted left the premises. Later his overcoat was
found on the showcase with merchandise in the pockets. He was indicted
for larceny. The jury, quite reasonably, thought he had been unsuccessful
and convicted him of attempt. The upper court argued: (a) Failure is an
element of attempt; (b) a simple asportation is a successful larceny; (c)
therefore the defendant was successful and his conviction is reversed.
Bunn v. Butler, 300 Ill. 269, 133 N. E. 246 (1921).
67 A statute in Illinois penalized "every person who shall obtain, or
attempt to obtain" money by means of a confidence game. This valiant
attempt of the legislature to penalize fraudulent conduct was defeated by
the Illinois Supreme Court in the following ingenious way: (a) the use of
the word "attempt" in the statute makes all the old common law decisions
relevant; (b) consequently the statute defined two separate crimes, the
completed crime, and the attempt; (c) the evidence showed success; (d)
therefore a conviction for attempt must be reversed. Graham v. People,
181 Ill. 477, 55 N. E. 179 (1899).
This case is then used to prove the result in the larceny case, stpra note
66.
Later a conviction for indecent liberties was appealed. The instruction,
u.ing the exact language of the statute, informed the jury that any person
"who shall take or attempt to take" liberties, etc. is punishable. The Illinois
Supreme Court held that the statute created two crimes with the same
penalty; that failure was an element of one but not of the other; that
under the instruction given the jury might get these crimes mixed, which
would interfere with the conception of failure as an element of criminal
attempts. Therefore the conviction was reversed, acting on the strength of
the case of Graham v. People, supra, though the evidence showed a brutal
assault. People v. Crane, 302 Ill. 217, 134 N. E. 99 (1922).
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similiar to the power which courts have given themselves in
that vague field known as common law crimes. This is a most
useful logical device and, while it may seem vague, no one con-
siders it confused.68 For example, suppose that a careless legis-
lature, omits the penalty in a criminal statute. The device of
common law crimes provides a way out of the dilemma. A
sketchy criminal code omits to prohibit an obviously dangerous
kind of conduct. The power to punish for common law crimes
gives the court freedom to act without appearing to encroach
upon the legislature. We are content to define this power in
terms which are broad enough to cover any case which might
arise. The vagueness of our definition, however, does not bother
us because we do not regard the law against common law
crimes as a law which must be enforced, such as the prohibition
law or the law against murder. Instead, we regard it as a use-
ful device under which courts are free to fill up omissions in
criminal codes.
The law of criminal attempts is exactly the same kind of a
thing. Considered apart from any particular crime it simply
means that courts are permitted to fill in the gaps which a set
of definitions inevitably leave when applied to human conduct.
The power to interpret statutes performs a similar function,
but the rules of statutory interpretation of criminal statutes are
never considered as definitions of crimes. The power to punish
for criminal attempts gives the court power to extend a crim-
inal statute without distorting its language. It is necessary to
our criminal system. To treat this power as the definition of
a substantive crime is either to destroy it or hopelessly to
confuse it.
Certainly confidence game statutes, pandering statutes, pro-
hibition laws, speed laws, laws against robbing the United
States mail, sedition laws, etc., were all passed to meet entirely
different problems. The court is given the power to extend the
policy of these statutes to conduct not included within their
specific language. Some of them will be extended to cover at-
tempts, others will not. Very often, an emotional reaction to-
ward the kind of conduct prohibited by the statute is about all
that will guide us. Thus we probably will not punish an at-
tempt to drive while intoxicated, but we will punish an attempt
at statutory rape. We will not punish attempts at attempts for
the purely administrative reason that it is cumbersome pro-
cedure-but we may depart from this rule if a feeling of fair-
ness compels us to adjust the penalty. Can we determine in
68 By vagueness we mean simply a lack of predicability; by con-
fusion we mean the existence of elaborate machinery, which cannot be
described, which operates on dissimilar situations, and which has a tendency
to produce irrational results.
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advance how we are going to feel about any one of these thou-
sands of crimes, now existing or about to be created, by formu-
lating rules which apply equally to all attempts at the conduct
prohibited by all of them? Is it useful to pretend that we can?
We may therefore restate the Law of Criminal Attempts as
follows:
The Law of Criminal Attempts and the Statutes making at-
tempts generally punishable give the courts a power to extend
the policy ;9 or limits of any particular criminal prohibition to
cover (a) conduct which is not within the definition laid down
by that rule but which in its tendencies is within its policy; or
(b) conduct which is not sufficiently serious to make a court
willing to apply the penalty provided in the particular rule in-
voked, but which it nevertheless feels should not go unpunished.
We cannot go further than this without having the particular
rule invoked before us.
Certain other propositions, mostly negative, follow from this
statement.
1. A criminal attempt is not a substantive crime without ref-
erence to the thing attempted, and the concept of it as such
is not a workable legal device.
2. Whether the power to punish for criminal attempts will
be applied to any particular crime will depend on the attitude
of the court toward the advisability of extending the rule pro-
hibiting that particular crime.
3. The closely related questions as to whether the defendant's
conduct was sufficiently blameworthy to deserve to be punished
under the particular rule invoked (here we have the whole prob-
lem of "intent") or whether his conduct was sufficiently danger-
ous (here we have the problem of whether the means were
adapted to the end, reasonable mistake in the means chosen,
-etc.,) or whether it was sufficiently far advanced toward its
objective (here we have the question as to when "mere prepara-
tion" becomes an attempt) have no meaning or content when
considered apart from the particular prohibition.
4. Solicitation involves the same considerations as attempts.
The conduct simply consists of hiring or inducing someone to
act instead of acting oneself. Courts should assume the same
kind of power to extend the limits of a given rule to cover per-
suasion and inducements, as well as conduct, where the policy of
the particular rule seems to require it. There is no object in
treating it differently from attempt. The distinction between
solicitation and attempt leads to an occasional absurd result, but
69 The word "policy" is selected because it does not pretend to have a
definite meaning. If we take a word which pretends to have definable
elements, we make all cases or statutes using that word relevant. However
different they are the use of the word binds them together.
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usually it is a harmless device for relieving a defendant of
liability under an attempt indictment when his conduct seems
not sufficiently serious to merit court action. The question of
the determination of the crimes, solicitation to which is criminal,
is one that cannot be limited by set rules apart from the con-
sideration of the particular crime solicited. 0
The description of the law of criminal attempts as a power
eliminates the artificial definition of criminal intent in all at-
tempt cases and the doubt and worry as to whether a person
in the abstract can blunder into an attempt in the abstract. It
also relieves us from difficulty in the cases which are always
so hard to reconcile. For example, an attempt at rape by a
boy under fourteen is not punishable as attempted rape because
the same policy which prevents small boys from being punished
for the principal crime applies to the attempted crime. That
this policy is not based on artificial conceptions of the nature of
impossibility is evident from the decisions. Most boys under
fourteen are incapable of rape and if one does exist he is suffi-
ciently abnormal to deserve a different kind of treatment.
There is nothing in this common sense result which need con-
fuse us in a case where the defendant tries to shoot a man
who does not happen to be where the defendant thinls he is.
We need have no further difficulty with the case which holds
that raising the figures on a check is not an attempt at forgery.
Obviously, forgery is the kind of crime which is often not prose-
cuted if the loss is made good and we do not have the same
desire to extend its limits as we do in the case of murder. The
same is true of the case where the defendant was indicted for
attempt to contract an incestuous marriage. The court un-
doubtedly felt that nothing short of the completed crime should
be punished. It placed the acts of the defendant under the
category of preparation only because it did not feel free to
state the reasons for its opinion. Whether the attempt to ad-
minister poison which is not noxious enough to cause death is
an attempt at poisoning certainly must depend upon the court's
attitude toward murder, and not on the doctrine that we will
punish only those who act reasonably because unreasonable per-
sons are not dangerous. Abortion presents a problem as dif-
ferent from poisoning as can be imagined. If Lady Eldon was
guilty of an attempt to smuggle when she had only non-dutiable
goods,71 and Mr. Jaffe was not guilty of an attempt to receive
stolen property when the goods had been repossessed by the
7 oThus the making of incendiary speeches and the publication of anti-
social doctrine are more logically classified under the power to punish
common law crimes than under solicitation or attempt.
71 See supra note 48.
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owner,7 2 we may find the explanation very easily in the differ-
ent attitude of courts toward larceny and smuggling. Larceny
has always been the playground of the law. If the Jaffe case
reaches an absurd result it is because the elaborate machinery
which the court used made it possible by concealing the real
issue of legislative policy behind a formula which describes all
attempts in general terms. The painful struggle which courts
had and still have with cases involving picking an empty pocket
would have been avoided if they had not been trying to define
attempt without relation to the thing attempted.
Does the so-called weight of authority compel the court to
talk in these concepts, or may they be permitted to talk about
the particular issue they are considering without either creat-
ing uncertainty in the criminal law or committing the crime
of judicial legislation.
An examination of the cases indicates not only that courts
are free to throw all this machinery overboard, but that they
are actually doing it in most cases. The great body of this
attempt philosophy comes from the interpretation of statutes
defining certain special conduct as criminal. There is no con-
ceivable reason in the rule of stare decisis why the courts in
interpreting these statutes should not talk about the particular
conduct prohibited. Moreover, there is no reason why a deci-
sion interpreting one statute should bind the court in the case
of an entirely different statute merely because both are part
of the Criminal Code.
A second class of cases involving these attempt formulae
comes under statutes punishing general attempts; these are
said to embody the common law though they often change the
penalty. That such statutes are designed to catch omissions
in not providing more particular statutes is obvious. While
their general form may lead us into undue generalization never-
theless an examination of the cases shows that courts are
omitting to talk in the formula of attempts without relation to
the thing attempted. It is significant to note that in the year
1930 the Century Digest found only five cases which, on ac-
count of the headnote or language of the opinion, it considered
should be classified under attempt, as a criminal law topic. It
is significant too that in Mr. Sayre's very exhaustive article
setting out the logical approach to the law of criminal attempt,
out of the 83 cases cited on which his generalizations are based,
71 were decided before 1910, only 4 after 1915, and the very
latest case in 1919. It is also interesting to note that out of all
these cases only about one fourth deal with attempts in general,
either under the common law or so-called general attempt
statutes. The other three-fourths are interpretations of statutes
72 People v. Jaffe, 185 N. Y. 497, 78 N. E. 189 (1906).
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dealing with particular classes of conduct such as assaults with
intent to kill, and the like.
Nor does the distinction between solicitation and attempt rest
on any such body of respectable authority that courts are com-
pelled to continue it if they prefer a more realistic treatment.
lost of the cases noting this distinction are cases where the
act of solicitation is not serious enough to be punishable,
whether considered as a separate crime or not. These may
be called the "mere solicitation" cases. The occasional decision,
by which a defendant deserving punishment is freed because he
is indicted for solicitation when he should have been indicted for
attempt, is becoming more and more difficult for our courts to
make. Crime commissions and other critics have fallen into
the habit of enumerating reversals on technicalities and writ-
ing about them critically.73 Such decisions no longer appear to
be as inevitably compelled by inexorable logic as they once were.
CONCLUSION
In criminal law as elsewhere, concepts and abstractions are
necessary to the administration of justice. It is the primary
business of appellate courts to create them and to keep them up
to date by changing their content and scope as may be neces-
sary to adjust them to each new case. It follows that some of
these concepts develop with a certain degree of symmetry and
usefulness. Others do not. Of those that fail in their purpose,
some produce results which offend persons of influence to such
an extent that they are changed by the legislature. But not
all useless rules and concepts succeed in offending people of
sufficient importance to get themselves repealed. They may, as
in the case of criminal attempts, be too confused to be suscepti-
ble of repeal. Enough books may have been written about
them, enough vested interests acquired in their verbal structure,
so that they may be strong enough to repeal the very statutes
which seek to change them. This too has sometimes happened
in the case of criminal attempts. Of course such concepts must
not be too outrageous if they are to survive. The old common
law distinction between larceny and embezzlement became too
unmanageable to continue. But the law of criminal attempts
has exercised more moderation; its very vagueness has been its
salvation, for it makes it possible to arrive at good results in
many cases. It is only in the occasional case that it achieves
an absurdity. Nevertheless it remains with us, a complete ob-
stacle to intelligible judicial speech and an encumbrance on
intelligent judicial action.
It is too seldom recognized by legal theorists that courts have
73 For example see Harno, The Suprent Court in Felony Cases, IL.
CR IE SURVEY (1929) 113, 219.
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a duty to get rid of useless abstractions and to reclassify the
situations which come before them for judgment, that this
duty may at times be more important than the further refine-
ment and analysis of ancient rules. Of course it must be rec-
ognized that there are interesting psychological hazards involved
in eliminating an old abstraction which do not stand in the way
of creating a new one. The court often does not feel quite
sure but that the abstraction may not be of use in some case
which is not before it at the time. It does not ordinarily have
the opportunity of investigating how much law it is repealing
and the notion of the law as a seamless web makes it hesitate.
There is a feeling that an attack on a particular abstraction
makes the world less safe for all abstraction. These considera-
tions, however, do not excuse legal writers; yet there is aston-
ishingly little research done, for the purpose of getting rid of
useless logical machinery. Most writers on confused legal situ-
ations seek to qualify and analyze the useless abstractions until
they obtain at least an appearance of certainty. They do not
like to admit frankly that some situations where predictability
is impossible can be handled more intelligently with less logical
machinery, rather than with more, because the presence of an
elaborate set of principles adds an additional and unnecessary
element of uncertainty by diverting the court's mind from the
real question to the rules.
Unintelligible judicial opinions and an occasional absurd re-
sult have, moreover, a peculiarly unfortunate result in the drim-
inal law. It is true that faulty court procedure does not have
the effect on the problem of crime which is often supposed.
Nevertheless it is of the utmost importance that the man on
the street should feel that criminal justice is being adminis-
tered fairly, non technically and intelligently. He has the
ability to judge the results and reasoning of a criminal case
better than a civil case because the situation is within his com-
prehension and he is more interested. His attitude toward
courts in general is determined largely by their efficiency in
criminal cases. Dean Pound has said that the extraordinary
lack of power allowed to American judges may well be due to
the impressions of the ruthless administration of criminal law
by Jeffries which our early settlers carried from England.
Most aspects of the problem of dealing with crime are neces-
sarily for the legislature. But it is not too much to expect
that courts will, without legislative assistance, at least free them-
selves, from useless abstractions too complicated for the legis-
lature to understand. In this direction the help of the legal
theorist is much needed, whether or not his conclusions add to
the dream of predictability in the administration of the criminal
law.
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